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Abstract 
 
Learning-in-action, the cyclical interplay of thinking and doing, is increasingly important 
for organizations as environments and required capabilities become more complex and 
interdependent.  Organizational learning involves both a desire to learn and supportive 
structures and mechanisms. We draw upon three case studies from the nuclear power and 
chemical industries to illustrate a four-stage model of organizational learning:  (1) local 
stage of decentralized learning by individuals and work groups, (2) control stage of 
compliance with rules, (3) open stage of acknowledgement of doubt and motivation to 
learn, and (4) deep learning stage of skillful inquiry and systemic mental models.  These 
four stages differ on whether learning is primarily single-loop or double-loop, i.e., 
whether the organization can surface and challenge the assumptions and mental models 
underlying behavior, and whether learning is relatively improvised or structured.  The 
case studies illustrate the details of learning practices and the nature of stage transitions.   2
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Learning-in-action, the cyclical interplay of thinking and doing (Argyris & Schon, 1996; 
Daft & Weick, 1984; Kolb, 1984), is increasingly important for organizations as they 
struggle to cope with rapidly changing environments and more complex and 
interdependent sets of knowledge.  Organizational knowledge is embodied in physical 
artifacts (equipment, layout, databases, documents), organizational structures (roles, 
reward systems, procedures), and people (skills, values, beliefs, practices) (cf., Kim, 
1993; Levitt & March, 1988; Schein, 1992).  Although organizations may “fill 
knowledge reservoirs” (Argote & Ingram, 2000) from theoretical principles, by 
imaginative rumination, or by observing others, enactment or putting this knowledge to 
use requires combining component-level knowledge and filling gaps by improvisation 
(Weick, 1998).  If the requisite performances are more unfamiliar, tacit, contextual, or 
contested among stakeholders, then the learning process will be more iterative, 
unpredictable, and emergent from evolving practice (Carlile, in press; Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995). 
 
 
1.1 Bridging Across Individuals and Groups 
 
Carrying out these learning activities as an organization involves complex 
interdependencies across people and groups (Crosson, Lane, & White, 1999; Kim, 1993).  
Knowledge is more than lists of facts that can be summed together (e.g., Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995).  Different parts of the organization, such as plant operators and 
corporate executives, “know” different things about how work is done.  Their knowledge 
is contained in different reservoirs (Argote & Ingram, 2000) and expressed in different 
languages by groups that live in different thought worlds (Dougherty, 1992).  Bridging 
across these groups requires common experiences and common referents, which are 
developed in bridging practices (Carlile, in press; Cook & Brown, 1999) including 
cooperative action, shared representations, collaborative reflection, and exchanges of 
personnel (Gruenfeld, Martorana, & Fan, 2000). 
 
 
1.2 Skills for Organizational Learning 
 
Every organization uses multiple routines and tools for learning.  As Popper and Lipshitz 
(1998) suggest, organizational learning involves both a desire to learn and the structures 
and mechanisms to enact learning effectively.  Skills around conflict management and 
diversity may help groups work with one another, regardless of the substance of their 
cooperation (Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999).  Specific logical and analytical skills may 
allow more meaning to emerge from available information.  More comprehensive mental 
models and systems thinking skills may allow attention to a wider variety of information 
and the interdependencies among them (Senge, 1990). 
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In this chapter, we draw upon several case studies of organizational learning from the 
nuclear power and chemical industries in order to illustrate a four-stage model of 
organizational learning.  By breaking the process of developing learning capabilities or 
absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) into stages, we illuminate the underlying 
dynamics and nature of changes as organizations move from stage to stage.   
 
Nuclear power plants, chemical plants, and other high-hazard or high-reliability 
production systems (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991) provide interesting cases for examining 
organizational learning because they have distinct learning strategies (Weick et al., 1999) 
arising from the need to understand complex interdependencies among systems (Perrow, 
1984), and avoid both potential catastrophes associated with trial-and-error learning 
(Weick, 1987) and complacency that can arise from learning only by successes (Sitkin, 
1992).  Weick et al. (1999) argue that maintaining high reliability requires mindfulness 
consisting of attention to hazards and weak signals (Vaughn, 1996), a broad action 
repertoire (Westrum, 1988), and a willingness to consider alternatives (March, Sproull, & 
Tamuz, 1991; Schulman, 1993).  They theorize that such “inquiry and interpretation 
grounded in capabilities for action” (p. 91) is encouraged by distinctive organizational 
processes, including preoccupation with failure and reluctance to simplify interpretations. 
 
 
2 STAGES OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
 
Research specifically on organizational learning and more generally on organizational 
growth and development suggests a progression in structure, goals, skills, and culture.  
Whether we use a biological metaphor to talk about individual growth and learning (e.g., 
Rooke & Torbert, 1998) and organization life-cycles (e.g., Quinn & Cameron, 1983), or 
an historical analysis of organizational forms over time (Chandler,1962; Perrow, 1970; 
Malone & Smith, 1988), we repeatedly find a progression in size, complexity, and 
interdependence with a more intrusive and unpredictable environment. 
 
In the next section of the paper, we discuss a four-stage framework (see Figure 1) for 
organizational learning.  These stages are presented as a provocative guide to analysis, 
not as a rigid model of development.  In any organization, there will be examples of each 
stage in operation in different parts of the organization and at different moments in time.  
However, the latter stages require shared understanding and collaborative effort across 
the organization, so these capabilities must become relatively widespread and commonly 
enacted if they are to be sustained.   “As Weber noted, ideal types are useful not because 
they are descriptively accurate – actual instances rarely evince all of the attributes of an 
ideal type – but because they serve as models that assist in thinking about social 
phenomena” (Barley & Kunda, 2001, p. 83). 
 
The four stages are organized into a 2 X 2 table in Figure 1, representing two dimensions: 
(1) single- and double-loop learning (Argyris, Putnam, & Smith, 1985) and (2) 
improvisation and structure.  In single-loop learning, goal-oriented actions are adjusted 
based on feedback to better achieve the same goal.  In double-loop learning, a deeper 
process surfaces and challenges underlying assumptions and values regarding the   4
selection of that goal.  Improvisation is a process of acting intuitively into an emergent 
situation rather than following structured procedures or plans (Weick, 1998).  Both 
dimensions should be understood as overall tendencies or relative frequency:  no 
organizations are purely single-loop or double-loop learners or only improvisational or 
structured. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
2.1 Local Stage 
 
Most organizations begin their lives small, relatively unstructured, and personal or 
informal, like an entrepreneurial startup (Quinn & Cameron, 1983) or a craft shop 
(Perrow, 1970).  Knowledge is based primarily on the experience and skill of individuals.  
Organization-specific and task-specific knowledge is local, contextual (Carlile, in press), 
tacit (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995), and sticky or hard to transfer (von Hippel, 1994).  
Exceptions occur frequently, and the organization relies on technical expertise to cope 
with surprises and provide flexibility or resilience (Wildavsky, 1988).  Decisions are 
made locally by those steeped in the details, and learning mostly occurs locally as well.  
Learning is decentralized in individuals or workgroups and primarily single-loop, i.e., 
behaviors are adjusted after comparison to performance standards or benchmark models, 
but underlying structures and assumptions are not challenged.  The organization is 
minimal and hardly self-aware. 
 
For example, from the beginning of the nuclear power industry, design engineers appear 
to have understood plant construction as a finite project that results in a production 
machine.  Once built and debugged, the plants were expected simply to run, a belief 
echoed by nuclear utilities and regulators:  "Technological enthusiasts heading the AEC 
[Atomic Energy Commission] believed most accidents were too unlikely to worry about" 
(Jasper, 1990, p. 52).  Given this belief, little attention was paid to “minor” problems in a 
plant or other plants in the industry, unless those problems affected production.   When a 
combination of minor problems and operators doing what they were trained to do 
produced the Three Mile Island (TMI) event in 1979, this constituted a "fundamental 
surprise" (Lanir, 1986) for the nuclear power industry.  The information needed to 
prevent the TMI event had been available from similar prior incidents at other plants, 
recurrent problems with the same equipment at TMI, and engineers’ critiques that 
operators had been taught to do the wrong thing in particular circumstances, yet nothing 
had been done to incorporate this information into operating practices (Marcus, 
Bromiley, & Nichols, 1989).  In reflecting on TMI, the utility’s president Herman 
Dieckamp said,  
To me that is probably one of the most significant learnings of the whole 
accident [TMI] the degree to which the inadequacies of that experience 
feedback loop... significantly contributed to making us and the plant 
vulnerable to this accident” (Kemeny, et al., 1979, p. 192).   5
In the local stage, information necessary for learning does not travel easily beyond 
particular workgroups and contexts. 
 
 
2.2 Control Stage 
 
Growth in terms of size and complexity is a major driver of formalization (e.g., Pugh et 
al, 1969).  To achieve economies of scale, expertise is organized into workgroups and 
departments that often become classic “silos” of knowledge.  To coordinate efficiently 
among workgroups and other subunits, organizations generate standard operating 
procedures and other formal routines to make work uniform and predictable, and 
facilitate communication (Nelson & Winter, 1981; Levitt & March, 1988).  Controls are 
instituted to encourage uniformity, including accounting controls, procedure manuals, 
training programs, planning processes, and so forth.  The “machine” metaphor and 
technical logic dominates (Carroll, 1998), such that performance is viewed as a 
summation of component-level, often explicit and measurable, contributions.  Learning 
itself is understood as a set of routines for training, performance feedback, statistical 
process control (Sitkin et al, 1994), after action review, procedure revision, and so forth.  
This learning is directed at further control through exploitation of the known rather than 
exploration of the unknown (March, 1991), single-loop evolutionary enhancements rather 
than double-loop revolutionary changes (Argyris & Schon, 1996). 
 
For most of its history, the nuclear power industry attempted to improve operations and 
prevent accidents through creation and enforcement of bureaucratic controls.  Elaborate 
probabilistic analyses were used to anticipate (Wildavsky, 1988) all possible failure paths 
and to design physical and procedural barriers to these paths.  When problems occurred, 
incident reviews typically identified actions that failed to comply with the rules, such as 
operators who did not follow procedures or engineers who made erroneous calculations 
(Carroll, 1995; Reason, 1990).  This single-loop learning tended to focus on causes 
proximal to the problem, with available solutions that could easily be enacted, and were 
acceptable to powerful stakeholders (Carroll, 1995; Tetlock, 1983).  Line managers 
wanted concrete solutions that “fix” problems (Carroll, 1998) and avoided costly or 
unpredictable actions: they disparage “trying to solve world hunger.”  The suggested 
corrective actions were usually to strengthen control mechanisms (more training, more 
supervision, more discipline), create more rules (more detailed procedures, more 
regulatory requirements), or design hazards and humans out of the system (according to 
technical design rules, e.g., “inherently safe” nuclear reactor designs).  Compliance to 
industry standards, professional standards, and procedure manuals was backed up by 
layers of internal and external monitoring and record keeping. 
 
Learning activities were separated from everyday work as part of training or a staff 
function to analyze problems or utilize industry experience.  Staff specialists were 
accountable for investigation activity and corrective action programs without giving them 
any real authority.  Problems stimulated blame that undermined information flow and 
learning (Morris & Moore, 2000; O’Reilly, 1978).  For example, an inspector criticized 
one plant after he discovered a set of informal records of problems without a plan to 
address each problem.  As one manager at a well-respected plant stated, “NRC [the US   6
Nuclear Regulatory Commission] wants crisp problem identification and timely 
resolution.”  The plant’s response was to stop documenting problems for which there 
were no immediate action plans, thus maintaining the illusion of “control” but decreasing 
their potential for learning.  Learning-in-action would represent a loss of control, both 
because it would acknowledge the unfinished nature of current routines (Schulman, 1993) 
and because the learning process itself is decentralized and informal.   
 
 
2.3 Open Stage 
 
Large, conservative, bureaucratic organizations can be highly successful in stable 
environments, but in turbulent and unpredictable environments, they do not learn or 
change fast enough.  Bureaucratic controls over behavior fail when routines cannot be 
written and rewritten for all activities and when learning is restricted to specialized 
groups such as R&D.  For example, Perron & Friedlander (1996) suggest that 
management systems for Process Safety Management “cannot yet be fully automated” 
(but notice the “yet”).  Even when under pressure from new competitors with new 
products, rapidly-changing technologies and customer preferences, deregulation, and so 
forth, large organizations may initially ignore these threats (Freeman, 1999).  Eventually, 
increased pressure and enlightened employees at various levels may open the 
organization to self-analysis, elaboration of bureaucratic mechanisms, and innovation 
(Quinn & Cameron, 1993).  
 
The open stage is marked by a climate of psychological safety (Edmondson, 1999) 
encouraging organization members to ask questions, explore, listen and learn. 
Assumptions about authority and control give way to recognition of uncertainty and the 
need for collaborative learning.  In the nuclear power industry, regulators and industry 
groups have long been calling for greater awareness of minor incidents and actions to 
avoid future trouble (Jackson, 1996; Rochlin, 1993).  As Weick, et al. (1999) state, “to 
move toward high reliability is to enlarge what people monitor, expect, and fear.”  Today, 
a typical nuclear power plant may identify over 2000 problems or incidents per year, 90% 
of which would have been ignored in the past.  Although efforts to accelerate learning 
may include technological initiatives such as web-based information exchanges and 
databases of new ideas and best-practice routines (Pan & Scarbrough, 1998; Davenport & 
Prusak, 1997), the open stage is based on attitudes and cultural values of involvement, 
sharing, and mutual respect.  This goes beyond the typical response of adopting others’ 
learning practices or buying consultants’ solutions in an effort to treat learning as another 
activity to fix and control (cf. Sitkin, et al, 1994).   
 
Open stage plants are developing double-loop learning skills.  Involvement of groups 
with different viewpoints provides feedback about varied assumptions and mental models 
and the impact of these assumptions on plant outcomes.  With the stigma of reporting 
problems minimized, plants at the open stage are able to surface problems early and make 
the problems actionable (Carroll et al., in press).  However, even the best plants still 
struggle with analyzing below the level of equipment problems, human error, and 
procedure inadequacies (Carroll, 1995, 1998, Carroll et al, in press).  Despite a desire to   7
improve, investigators and managers seldom look for fundamental or deep, systemic 
causes because they lack ready-made actions to address such issues and ways of 
evaluating their success (remnants of the control stage).  The skills and discipline of 
deeper learning often develop later than the willingness to learn.   
 
 
2.4 Deep Learning Stage 
 
The final stage, as we envision it, would build upon the open stage by adding more 
capability for double-loop learning that promotes understanding of deep, systemic causes 
and creating a wider range of action possibilities to address such causes.  Organizations at 
this stage would be capable not only of mutual respect across internal and external 
boundaries, but also skillful inquiry and facility to gain insights, challenge assumptions, 
and create comprehensive models (Argyris & Schon, 1996; Senge, 1990). Analyses 
would be based on facts but connect logically to systemic, organizational, cultural, and 
political viewpoints and experience with a repertoire of actions that can change these 
deep structures.  Participants transcend component-level understanding and additive 
models of performance to develop systems thinking skills and more comprehensive 
mental models.   
 
Deep learning practices are not widespread in the nuclear power and chemical industries. 
Carroll, Sterman, & Marcus (1998) relate one example of an innovative technique that 
introduced such practices to Du Pont chemical plants.  As part of a company-wide cost-
reduction effort, a benchmarking study showed that Du Pont spent more than its 
competitors on maintenance, yet had worse equipment availability.  A culture of reactive 
fire-fighting had developed, with workers regularly pulled off jobs to do corrective 
maintenance.  Responding to the benchmarking study, a series of cost-cutting initiatives 
were undertaken that had no lasting impact.  Finally, one team questioned the basic 
assumption that reducing maintenance costs could help reduce overall manufacturing 
costs; they thought that the effects of maintenance activities were tightly linked to so 
many aspects of plant performance that no one really understood the overall picture.   
 
Du Pont was able to improve maintenance only after a collaborative conceptual 
breakthrough.  An internal team developed a dynamic model of the system of 
relationships around maintenance (a "modeling for learning" exercise with the assistance 
of a researcher/consultant, Senge & Sterman, 1991).  However, they were unable to 
transmit the systemic lessons of the model through ordinary means.  Instead, the team 
created an experiential game in which plant employees play the roles of functional 
managers and discover new ways to think about plant activities, share their experiences 
and ideas, and test programs and policies.  Having a broad range of employees with a 
system-wide understanding of the relationships between operations, maintenance, quality, 
and costs laid the groundwork for a successful pump maintenance pilot program.  In the 
deep learning stage, the organization has the ability to come up with alternative 
assumptions and models to guide action toward more desirable outcomes, experiment 
with the new ideas-in-action, and track feedback on their effectiveness. 
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In the remainder of this chapter, we present three case studies of organizations that made 
significant transitions from stage to stage.  Presenting the cases as transitions clarifies the 
differences between stages and illustrates the challenges of changing behavior, emotions, 
and mental models.  It also allows us to emphasize that organizations are now, and may 
always be, in transition.  Following the case studies, we draw some lessons about 
learning-in-action and the stage model. 
 
 
3 A SHIFT FROM LOCAL TO CONTROL STAGE 
 
In the first case study, a nuclear power plant investigated an incident in which an 
employee was seriously hurt. This plant was attempting to improve safety and 
performance in part by using a newly upgraded incident investigation process.  The 
investigation created an opportunity to raise collective awareness about local work 
practices and helped managers strengthen controls and increase conformity to rules. 
 
 
3.1 Fall from Roof 
 
An electrical maintenance supervisor sent three men to replace light bulbs inside the 
“hot” machine shop, the area used to decontaminate equipment of radiological residue.  
The men headed off to the work area and discussed among themselves how to reach the 
light bulbs.  They decided that one of them, whom we call Joe, would access the lights by 
climbing on the roof of a shed within the larger building.   Joe and one coworker dressed 
in anti-contamination suits and propped a ladder against the shed wall.  Joe crawled up 
the ladder and onto the roof.   As he was about to reach the lights, one of the roof panels 
gave way, dumping him 10 feet to the ground below.  His injuries included a broken 
scapula, a broken rib, three fractures to the small bones near the spine, a lacerated lung 
and arm.  His coworkers used a nearby phone to call for help.  EMTs arrived shortly and 
took Joe to the hospital. 
 
3.2 The Plant’s Interpretation 
 
For an event of this seriousness, a multi-discipline team was assembled to collect 
information, analyze causes, and make recommendations.  The team noted that a number 
of standard operating procedures regarding safety assessment were not followed.  When 
the electrical supervisor assigned three men to the job, no one was designated to be in 
charge.  The supervisor did not conduct a pre-job brief (explaining the operational and 
safety issues involved in the job) and no one thought to walk down the job (conduct 
physical examination and discussion of the safety challenges at the work site) or plan the 
safest way to do the job.  The workers failed to follow rules requiring fall protection (e.g., 
a harness attached to a fixed support) when working aloft and use of a folding ladder by 
unfolding it rather than leaning it against a wall. 
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The team’s report noted that these actions and omissions may be part of a local culture of 
risk-taking.  The tone of the task was set, in part, by the most senior electrical worker of 
the three and the only one who had changed these light bulbs before.  He told the others 
that they would “love this job ‘cause it’s kind of tight up there.”  Based on their 
interviews with Joe and others, the investigators speculated that this challenge struck Joe, 
who had just transferred to this department, as an “opportunity to succeed.”  Lastly, the 
workers ignored warning signs that the job was not routine.  Nobody blinked when Joe 
was advised to stay on the one and a half-inch steel framework of the building because it 
was the strongest part.  Joe failed to reconsider the job when his hand slipped slipped 
through a skylight and he nearly fell, shortly before slipping again and falling through. 
 
The investigation team’s report documented lack of compliance with established safety 
practices and suggested ways to enhance compliance with existing rules.  The report 
concluded that:   
The cause of the accident was a failure of the employee, the employee in 
charge, and the supervisor to properly follow the Accident Prevention 
Manual requirements for working in elevated positions.  The hazards 
associated with the job were not properly assessed; a stepladder was 
improperly used, and fall protection was not used when climbing on a 
structure. 
The report then recommended that the plant should: 1) raise sensitivity to safety on 
routine jobs by appointing a full-time safety person; require managers to communicate to 
supervisors and supervisors communicate to employees the plant’s expectations 
regarding industrial safety; and require department managers to provide feedback to the 
plant manager on each department’s safety issues; 2) make more detailed guidelines on 
working aloft available to employees; 3) consider instituting a company-wide program on 
“Working in Elevated Positions,” and 4) counsel all employees involved in the incident. 
 
 
3.3 Making the Transition Between Organizational Learning Stages 
 
The incident investigation illustrates the plant’s effort to shift its learning orientation 
from local to control.  The report highlights the failure of workers and first line 
supervisor to comply with existing rules and procedures.  The corrective actions’ aim to 
increase awareness and compliance with these rules by appointing a safety advocate, 
having superiors reinforce the safety message, and improving procedures. Information 
was generated about local work practices and compliance with rules that could be shared 
across groups, discussed openly, and used to institutionalize new work procedures.  The 
focus is on changing actions to comply with rules in order to correct a mismatch between 
desired results (keep people safe) and actual results (Joe is hurt), i.e., single-loop learning 
(Argyris & Schon, 1996).  
 
Single-loop learning is very compatible with a desire for control and with the norms of 
the engineering profession that have shaped many industries such as nuclear power 
(Rochlin & von Meier, 1994).  Carroll (1995) argued that there is a “fixing” orientation 
dominated by analysis of complex situations into additive components, linear cause and   10
effect thinking, a search among known solutions, a belief in the adequacy of current 
understanding, and an assumption that “any error is avoidable through engineering design 
and managerial controls” (p. 187).   
 
In a control-oriented organization, managers are judged by their lack of problems or the 
speed with which problems are resolved and control reasserted.  Challenges to that 
control are threatening and become political issues (Carroll, 1995; Tetlock, 1983).  The 
investigation process itself is “delegated participation” (Nutt, 1998), a frequently 
ineffective process in which representatives suggest solutions to managers who may 
resist implementation (Carroll, in press).  One member of the investigation team 
commented, “When it was becoming apparent what the real problem was, I think the 
group became (temporarily) unsure where to go—what to do—it looked like a big step.”  
It appears that the report writers had cause for concern.  Another team member reported,   
“We put together three different drafts and each time someone in upper management 
disagreed with what we wrote.  Finally the plant manager stepped in and accepted our 
answer.”   
 
The investigation team did not question their assumption that “compliance with safety 
rules will improve safety.”  A focus on compliance distinguishes those who make the 
rules from those who are being controlled.  There is a contest for control between 
managers and engineers who are labeled as strategists and designers of the plant and 
operators and maintenance people who are labeled as implementers and doers (Carroll, 
1998; Schein, 1996).  The rules can become an empty ritual as alienated workers 
withdraw from the learning process.  Without the opportunity to challenge underlying 
assumptions about why they work the way they do and the chance to reshape work 
accordingly, employees tend to feel that the corrective actions are simply another layer of 
control imposed from the outside.  The investigators did not ask double-loop learning 
questions such as, “What frames do supervisors and workers hold that would allow a 
casual approach to safety develop and endure?”; “How does the status and career 
advancement system contribute to a culture of risk taking?”; “What frames allowed 
management to have a design problem (lights in an unsafe place) exist for so long?”; or 
“How does the work system of separated functions and hierarchical authority inhibit 
mutual understanding?” 
 
 
4 A SHIFT FROM CONTROL TO OPEN STAGE  
 
The second case describes an organization-wide change effort in response to a crisis that 
shut down a large nuclear power station and nearly bankrupted the utility.  It is a stark 
reminder of the importance of people in technically-dominated companies. 
 
 
4.1 The Millstone Turnaround 
 
In October 1996, the Millstone nuclear power station outside New London, Connecticut, 
received an unprecedented order from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to   11
keep its plants closed until they could demonstrate a “safety conscious work 
environment.”  The problem had come to public attention earlier through a cover story in 
Time magazine about harassment and intimidation of employees who brought safety 
concerns to management.  An interviewee at Millstone (Carroll & Hatakenaka, 2001) 
labeled the management culture as “male... militaristic – control and command.”  The 
NRC review (Hannon et al., 1996) concluded that there was an unhealthy work 
environment, which did not tolerate dissenting views and stifled questioning attitudes 
among employees, and therefore failed to learn and change.  As the report said, “Every 
problem identified during this review had been previously identified to Northeast Utilities 
management… yet the same problems were allowed to continue.”   
 
New senior management was brought in to reestablish the trust of regulators, the public, 
and employees.  Investments were made in physical improvements and extensive 
documentation to meet rising industry standards, but a critical component was culture 
change.  Employees needed to feel safe about reporting concerns, to believe that 
managers could be trusted to hear their concerns and to take appropriate action.  
Managers had to believe that employees were worth listening to and worthy of respect.  
In short, the underlying values had to change from control to openness and trust.  It took 
over two years to shift the culture and learning stage of the plant, but in June 1998 the 
internal oversight groups and external regulators certified that Millstone could restart its 
largest unit, and a second unit would restart a year later (the smallest and oldest unit was 
permanently decommissioned) (see Carroll & Hatakenaka, 2001 for more details).  
 
 
4.2 The Plant’s Interpretation 
 
In September 1996, the new CEO for Nuclear Power, Bruce Kenyon, set the scene for 
change by an address to all employees on his first day, in which he introduced his values: 
high standards, openness and honesty, commitment to do what was right and two-way 
communications.  He immediately revamped the top management team and introduced a 
new employee concerns program.   
 
His subsequent actions enacted and modeled openness and trust.  Throughout the next 
months, Kenyon met regularly with small work groups and in large all-hands meetings to 
give information and encourage two-way communication:  “It shocked them to get candid 
answers.”  Upon hearing Kenyon say publicly at his first NRC meeting that he found the 
organizations “essentially dysfunctional,” an interviewee from the NRC remembers 
thinking, “here’s a fellow who at least recognizes the problem.”  Based on 
recommendations from an employee task force redesigning the employee concerns 
program, Kenyon agreed to create an Employee Concerns Oversight Panel (ECOP) to 
have an independent voice and report directly to him.  ECOP was staffed with passionate 
advocates who argued with each other and with management, but over time they evolved 
a workable role.  The panel’s existence “sent a message to the work force that employees 
could act as oversight of management.”   
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Kenyon allowed himself to be fallible and to enlist participation.  When two contractors 
were terminated on the grounds of poor performance and the Director of the Employee 
Concerns Program provided evidence that the terminations had been improper, Kenyon 
quickly reversed his decision.  As one of his senior managers recalls about their working 
relationship, Kenyon “went along with all my recommendations.  He didn’t always 
agree…  [Sometimes he] swallowed hard.”  He called upon employees to voice their 
public support for Millstone to counterbalance media criticism:  “when are you going to 
say what you think?”  An ad hoc employee group self-organized, gathered over 1500 
signatures on a petition, attended public meetings, wrote to newspapers, and otherwise 
expressed their commitment to a management that trusted them to become part of the 
solution. 
 
Individual managers told stories of personal transformations and how they came to 
understand the nature of the problems.  The case of the operations vice president was 
perhaps the most dramatic.  Typical of the old-style management, he was weary of 
“whiners,” and “didn’t believe anyone would harass someone who brought forth safety 
concerns.”  When the two contractors were terminated and the employee concerns 
program offered their view that the terminations were improper, “It was one of those 
moments your perception changes... a watershed for me.”  He also remembers vividly his 
visit with several other Millstone managers to another nuclear power plant that had made 
a dramatic turnaround, where he learned that safety concerns could make business sense. 
 
Millstone was typical of an industry in which managers are “not high on people skills, for 
example, few can read nonverbal signals.”  They had to appreciate that employees’ 
perception was their reality.  For example, when members of the training and operations 
departments were disciplined for inaccuracies in training documentation two years 
earlier, employees immediately assumed that the former training director was being 
punished because he had been an outspoken critic of management.  Management had 
failed to anticipate reactions or to minimize the impression of retaliation.  Managers had 
to learn new skills, including sensitivity to their own and others’ emotions and 
perceptions.  Through extensive new training programs and coaching by organizational 
development consultants, they had to “learn the difference between anger, hurt, and a 
chilling effect” and avoid confusing a fear of reprisal with a lack of confidence that 
management would take effective action. 
 
Openness and trust emerged organically through multiple mechanisms and venues. We 
have already mentioned the Employee Concerns Program (ECP) that provided 
confidential ways to report issues for investigation and the Employee Concerns Oversight 
Panel (ECOP) that gave a direct connection between employee representatives and the 
CEO Nuclear.  The Executive Review Board was created after the contractor 
terminations to review all disciplinary actions, comprising senior managers and an ECOP 
representative as an observer.  By opening up the management process, it helped restore 
employee trust in management, and created an environment for managers to learn and 
enact new values.   The People Team, a coordinating group among human resources, 
legal department, ECP, ECOP, management, and organizational development 
consultants, met daily to respond to problems and organize to address issues and monitor   13
progress.  Internal Oversight groups and an independent third-party consulting group 
required by the NRC provided additional monitoring and advice.  These multiple 
mechanisms and forums allowed broad participation so that managers and employees 
could share information, develop common language, learn by doing, and build trust by 
reacting well to challenges.   
 
 
4.3 Making the Transition Between Organizational Learning Stages 
 
The NRC requirement that Millstone develop a “safety conscious work environment” and 
demonstrate this to the satisfaction of an independent third-party consultant was 
unprecedented in the industry.  The NRC offered no guidance.  Millstone had to find its 
own way to move from a control stage characterized by centralized authority and mutual 
distrust to an open stage characterized by communication, trust, and participation.    
 
Millstone managers were proud of Millstone’s excellent record in the industry, built on 
technical leadership of the industry.  Financial distress following the completion of the 
third unit led to an atmosphere of cost-cutting and production emphasis; the heroes were 
the ones who got the job done without breaking the budget.  When employees 
complained about technical problems or the external regulators criticized them for lack of 
documentation or growing backlogs of work, managers ignored them or blamed the 
messengers.  Managers believed that Millstone’s design features and managerial controls 
were sufficient to operate the plant safety and reliably.  Complaining employees and 
meddling regulators were annoying distractions that threatened their sense of control.  In 
short, managers and employees lived in separate thought worlds (Dougherty, 1992) with 
strong cultural barriers and a perceived contest for control.  
 
New senior management, external intervention, and an infusion of outside employees 
broke through some of that defensiveness.  Management’s basic assumption that “we 
know everything we need to know” was challenged (cf. Schulman, 1993).  And so was 
employees’ basic assumption that “management can’t be trusted.”  Because senior 
management reacted well to critical events such as the contractor terminations and 
independent voices were allowed to challenge the status quo, double-loop learning 
occurred.  Multiple venues emerged for managers and employees to talk together and 
work on the common problem of rebuilding Millstone.  Managers began to listen and 
trust the employees enough to act on what was being said; in turn, employees began to 
feel safer about speaking out (Edmondson, 1999) and to trust that management would 
listen and take action.  The most powerful way to regain trust is to work together with a 
common purpose (Kramer, 1999; Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998).  
 
Managers not only became more open to information coming from employees and 
external observers, but also became aware of new kinds of information.  Control-oriented 
managers, some of whom get their way by yelling and threatening, are generally unaware 
of their own emotionality and try to restrict any emotionality in their subordinates.  They 
claim to value facts and rationality, even when they are using fear to exercise control.  
They did not realize that emotions and perceptions are reality.  The more open   14
environment at Millstone marked an increase in interpersonal skills and emotional 
intelligence (Goleman, 1995).  Emotions and perceptions could be anticipated, 
considered, discussed, and managed. 
 
 
5 A SHIFT FROM OPENNESS TO DEEP LEARNING 
 
The third case was part of a larger, plant-wide effort to begin using root cause analysis 
(RCA) teams as a way to address, simultaneously, a recent history of financial losses, 
some dangerous incidents, and repeated equipment failures.  The idea of using root cause 
analysis to address adverse incidents in the plant was introduced to plant management as 
a result of a merger with another petrochemical company, which used the RCA process 
already.  Two headquarters staff at this petrochemical company had been working for a 
decade to promote more strategic and systemic thinking at operational and executive 
levels, using RCA as one of several approaches, and their progress was just beginning to 
accelerate.  The Plant Manager had requested that they introduce their RCA practice to 
his plant with a training intervention.  The plant decided to train about 20 plant 
employees, operators, maintenance staff, engineers, and first line supervisors to conduct 
RCAs by exploring, in-depth, four significant recent incidents.   
 
Each incident investigation team included some members from inside the plant and some 
from outside, and at least one experienced root cause facilitator.  The overall process 
included training in investigation, analysis, and reporting methods during the course of a 
three-week time frame, culminating in reports to plant management.  Training was timed 
to correspond to the needs of the teams as they collected maintenance and operations 
logs, reviewed physical evidence, interviewed involved parties and knowledgeable 
experts, analyzed causes, and prepared reports. 
 
 
5.1 Charge Heater Fire 
 
The charge heater fire investigation examined the explosion and fire in a charge heater 
that cost $16 Million for lost production and repairs.   Charge heaters are large gas-fueled 
burners used in the transformation of waste products from oil refining back into usable 
products through hydrocracking, a dirty and dangerous process requiring very high heat 
and pressure. The residue of this process is coke (coal dust) which can accumulate on the 
inside of heater tubes.  In addition to unearthing causes of the explosion, plant managers 
also wanted to discover and ameliorate the conditions which led to this event and might 
lead to future events.  
 
While the causal analysis presented below may seem extremely straightforward, its 
simplicity is the result of a rigorous and laborious root cause analysis process that 
involved four elements: A time line of events; an “Is/Is not” process that differentiates 
circumstances where the event occurred from similar circumstances where it did not; a 
detailed causal event diagram; and a process of categorizing the quality of data used to 
draw inferences in the causal event diagram (is it a verifiable fact, an inference, or a   15
guess).  In doing these analyses, members of the team argued with each other, built on 
each other’s ideas, and alternated between stunned amazement and appreciation at the 
differences in each other’s views of the refinery. 
 
 
5.2 The Plant’s Interpretation 
 
Distilling and analyzing the information available, the team concluded that the explosion 
and fire were due to a tube inside the charge heater that ruptured because the three quarter 
inch steel skin got too hot and tore.  The team found that three factors contributed to the 
heater explosion: (1) high heat input, (2) low heat removal, and (3) unawareness on the 
part of operators of the actual tube skin temperature.  First, operators ran the burners in 
the charge heater unevenly to increase heat in order to achieve the desired production 
level, while avoiding alarms that would signal an unsafe condition.  Second, heat was 
removed more slowly than usual from the tube skin because coke had adhered to the 
inside of the tubes and was acting as an insulator.  There was more coke than usual 
because it was assumed that a new decoking process worked as well as the previous 
process and no one had checked for coke build up.  Third, the combination of running 
some tubes hotter (at a higher gas pressure) and the build-up of coke moved the high-heat 
point up the tube.  The thermocouple meant to detect temperature on the tube skin, set at 
a height specified in the heater design, was now below the hottest part of the tube, so that 
operators believed the tube temperature was acceptable.  The tube ruptured above the 
thermocouple. 
 
The team noted as a “Key Learning” that plant staff made decisions without questioning 
assumptions that seemed to underlie them.   First, the maintenance department changed 
decoking processes but did not know and never checked if the new process was effective.  
Second, operators increased the burner pressure in the charge heater but did not know the 
consequences of doing so.  Third, operators changed the pattern of firing heater tubes (to 
fire hotter around the perimeter) but again did not know the consequences of doing so.   
On the basis of these insights, the team’s lead recommendation for future action was that 
the plant identify “side effects” and be more aware of the broader “decision context” 
when changing production processes. 
 
The team deepened their analysis as they discussed why assumptions about the 
effectiveness and safety of the new decoking process and the modified charge heater tube 
firing practices were never questioned at the time that changes were made.  They 
speculated that their colleagues probably were unaware of the assumptions they were 
making.  Our observations of the team’s investigation and our post hoc interviews with 
team members highlight the team members’ amazement and interest in “how quick we 
jump to conclusions about things.”  The team repeatedly mentioned the fact that, prior to 
learning the new investigation process, they rarely questioned their own conclusion-
drawing processes and the assumptions that underlay them.  One team member 
summarized his new approach by saying he now questions his co-workers:  “I say, are 
you sure?  Are you sure?  Did you look at the initial aspects of what happened?” 
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As they worked on the investigation, the charge heater team frequently discussed their 
discovery of unanticipated and previously unknown interactions between apparently 
unrelated plant processes such as decoking and tube firing.  When the team got to the 
bottom of their cause tree they noticed that each leg was a necessary but not sufficient 
contributor to the incident.  In one of its verbal reports to other investigation teams during 
the training sessions, the charge heater team noted that, “We are seeing that several things 
combine over time to create an event.”  Independent decisions by maintenance to change 
decoking, the inspection service to trust that the new decoking was effective, and 
operators to change burner tube firing practices ended up interacting to produce the 
heater fire.   The team described their learning to other teams by saying, “It appears that 
in most cases there are elements of human factors (systems) that show up if you dig deep 
enough.”  
 
Based on the insights from this team and from the other teams, the plant decided to 
implement a “Management of Change Process” to address the unanticipated side effects 
and interactions that caused problems.  According to follow-up interviews with team 
members six months after their investigation, the actual results are mixed. One team 
member felt the plant Management of Change process had teeth: 
 “The biggest issue that came out [of the root cause analysis training] was 
management of change.  MOC.  Now people pay more attention to adhering to the 
MOC process.  It may be that the RCA training helped focus attention on MOC. 
MOC is serious.  It is real.  If you don’t do it, your job is on the line.  If not do it, 
have to explain why not.” 
However, another team member felt, “There are no legs on the management of change 
effort.  It is just a lot of talk.” 
 
 
5.3 Making the Transition Between Organizational Learning Stages 
 
The charge heater investigation provides examples of an organization increasing both 
openness and deep learning.  The independent decisions that changed decoking and 
heater tube firing practices illustrate aspects of the local stage of organizational learning. 
In our observations of the training session, it was evident that at least some participants 
were anxious about being open with colleagues in their own department or in other 
departments, or with management.  Would operators talk to engineers?  Would an 
operator working on this investigation be perceived as having sold out?  Would managers 
listen to reports that were critical of their own behavior?  The investigation could have 
blamed the operators for “getting around” the tube temperature alarms, ignored the role 
of management decisions about production goals, and instituted more monitoring and 
rules.  A control approach to learning could have reinforced barriers to the open flow of 
information and discouraged participation, and failed to get at the underlying, systemic 
causes of the event.  
 
However, plant management was not approaching its problems from the viewpoint of 
control.  Instead, there was a desire to create more openness, and to demonstrate the value 
of openness and deep learning for achieving better performance.  During the course of the   17
training and investigation, teams experienced more openness and collaboration than they 
expected.  There was a willingness to confront reality and to surface underlying 
assumptions about “how we do work around here.”  Support from a new plant manager 
helped encourage full participation.  That support was itself an outcome of the training 
team who were working publicly with the investigation teams but privately meeting with 
management to reduce their defensiveness and enlist their visible engagement.  And, it 
was evoked and reinforced by specific features of root cause analysis that require close 
attention to factual details, data quality, and cause-effect relationships. 
 
The training team was very deliberate in bringing a deep learning approach to the plant.  
Their goal was to educate management by challenging their mental models with rich and 
compelling data and interpretations.  The underlying concept is that managers establish 
the conditions for performance, i.e., they manage the system.  Managers do not control 
behavior, but rather provide the resources (people, time, money, equipment, plans, 
opportunities, legitimacy, procedures, etc.) by which the system will operate.   
 
The team investigation began to create deep learning when they started addressing 
operations at the plant from a systemic perspective and challenging assumptions. 
Paradoxically, the process of “drilling down” precisely and narrowly into causes of this 
incident allowed the team to develop new awareness of interdependencies across the 
system.  They recognized interactions among components of the system and began to 
understand a central tenet of the quality movement (e.g. Goldratt & Cox, 1992) that 
working to optimize individual components does not automatically add up to an 
optimized system.  Most importantly, they developed and practiced double-loop learning 
capabilities to recognize assumptions and mental models as separate from reality, 
understand that assumptions and mental models affect behaviors and outcomes, imagine 
alternative mental models to guide action toward more desirable outcomes, and take 
action with the new mental models (Friedman & Lipshitz, 1992; Argyris, et al., 1985). 
 
The process of root cause analysis encouraged awareness of mental models and ability to 
work on mental models rather than through them.  The team became aware of their own 
mental models and the distinction between model and reality, which is a necessary step to 
double-loop learning (Friedman & Lipshitz, 1992).  In our interviews with team 
members, they universally highlighted the benefit of having a diverse team because of the 
surprising differences among people’s ways of looking at the same problem.  The rigor of 
the root cause analysis process encouraged them to “hold their assumptions lightly” as 
the analysis held these views up to comparison and disconfirmation.   
 
The cause-effect diagrams worked as a boundary object to help reveal tacit assumptions 
about plant processes that were key links in the causal chains leading to the heater 
explosion.  The team’s cause-event tree included the three assumptions: “[desired] charge 
rate [desired production rate] dictates heater firing”; “sandjetting works as well as steam 
air decoking [to remove coke from inside heater tubes]”; and “there are no ‘hot spots’ 
[overheated areas] on the tubes.”  Developing a gut sense that assumptions matter in 
shaping action and outcomes is important to overcome fears about “trying on” new 
mental models (Rudolph, Taylor, & Foldy, 2000).  Their recommendation that   18
“identifying side effects and documenting decision context become a central part of 
decision making at [the plant]” implies a new insight:  “Decisions made in one context 
may have side effects in other contexts and these are important to consider.” 
 
 
6 Insights About Organizational Learning 
 
Our case studies and other data from the nuclear power and petrochemical industries 
(Carroll, 1998; Carroll et al., in press) suggest that transformations to double-loop 
learning and systemic thinking is difficult.  It is rare to find companies that are skilled in 
deep learning.  The most advanced of the companies we have studied are only beginning 
a transformation into deep learning, motivated by a few subversive visionaries and the 
intense pressures of competition and regulation.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
companies adopt programs such as TQM and learning organization more to copy success 
stories and achieve legitimacy rather than through commitment and understanding.  No 
wonder they rapidly move on to the next management fad. 
 
 
6.1 Stages of Organizational Learning 
 
One possibility for unpacking the difficult transformation to deep learning is to recognize 
that there are multiple elements that must be brought together to support this 
transformation.  Awareness and measurability are important, but so are cultural values 
and motives, supportive structures and resources, specific skills and tools, and concepts 
and mental models.  The large, technologically-driven organizations that we have studied 
do not appear to transform all these elements at once or even to change them gradually.  
Instead, there is a natural order to their focus.  Control through measurement, monitoring, 
incentives, and other traditional bureaucratic mechanisms seems to come naturally to 
managers and engineers (Carroll, 1998; Schein, 1996).  However, the control stage can 
become a competency trap that inhibits learning (Levitt & March, 1988). 
 
Most of the organizations we have studied seem to move out of the control stage by 
recognizing the limitations of top-down control and promoting more participation and 
open exchange of information throughout the organization and between the organization 
and the outside world.  The “questioning attitude” and “safety culture” advocated in these 
industries are directed at acknowledging doubt (Schulman, 1993), increasing awareness 
or mindfulness (Weick et al., 1999), respecting the contributions of others, and placing a 
positive value on teamwork and learning.  Such trust can only be developed by 
observations of the experience of courageous pioneers who take early risks to tell the 
truth.  When open behavior is validated by others, trust is built and openness spreads in a 
virtuous cycle. 
 
The open stage is also characterized by an awareness of people as different from 
machines.  An ability to acknowledge emotions, conflicts, and different perceptions that 
underlie work relationships and political contests allows for discussion of the human side 
of organization.  Of course, managers are uncomfortable and initially incompetent in this   19
domain, but openness to its importance builds a greater emphasis on managers, 
employees, and consultants with people skills.  Over time, people learn by doing and 
through feedback from colleagues and coaches. 
 
Openness to learning becomes linked to a discipline for learning in the transition to what 
we call the deep learning stage.  The complexity and pace of change of modern 
organizations requires more than a desire to learn.  Special circumstances for learning and 
concepts and techniques that make learning more efficient are needed to break through 
long-held assumptions and cognitive habits.  Deep learning is not simply the use of 
particular techniques such as root cause analysis. There are many versions of “root cause 
analysis,” most of which are used with minimal training to find and fix problems (Carroll, 
1995) rather than to challenge deep assumptions with rigorous and systemic thinking, just 
as TQM can be used for control rather than learning (Sitkin et al., 1994).  It is not 
particular tools such as root cause analysis that lead to learning, but rethinking actions 
and assumptions in the context of new concepts that underlie the tools, such as data 
quality, rigorous cause-effect connections, systems thinking, mutual respect across 
groups, insight into personal and political relationships, and double-loop learning.  The 
tools and the learning activities are only an opportunity to have new conversations, enact 
new behaviors, develop new skills, and build new relationships. 
 
 
6.2 Learning-in-Action 
 
The cases reinforce the importance of learning through action.  Although some kinds of 
knowledge are represented explicitly (numbers, words) and easy to store and transfer, 
many kinds of knowledge are difficult to represent or separate from their context.  These 
kinds of knowledge have to be reconstructed by users, improvised, tried out and modified 
to suit the occasion.  Enactment is problematic, and learning is in the doing, individually 
and collectively.  Learning is in the connection between action and reflection, in making 
knowledge actionable (implementation) and action knowledgeable (sensemaking) 
(Argyris, et al, 1985; Crosson, et al., 1999). 
 
From this viewpoint, incident investigations involve both access to information and 
socially constructive processes such as imagination and negotiation.  The collective 
analysis of factual details (with a disciplined logic that identified gaps) helped to drive a 
systemic understanding.  The cause-effect diagrams were boundary objects (Carlile, in 
press) negotiated by the team in a process of knowing (Cook & Brown, 1999) that helped 
surface previously unarticulated mental models of the work environment, compare them, 
and arrive at new, shared views.  Some of the learning was articulated in the written 
report, another boundary object negotiated between the team and managers that initiates 
corrective actions and feeds databases, but much remained unwritten (although discussed 
as part of the reporting out process). 
 
Experience with learning cycles increased tolerance for short-term difficulties and 
occasioned resource shifts away from production toward learning.  A systemic view 
suggests that changes take time to unfold, that things get worse before they get better   20
(since resources are shifted away from immediate needs), and that leverage points must 
be identified for selective investment in changes that are not simply ceremonial but 
actually transform practice.  Problems are not simply someone’s fault, but rather a feature 
of the system; altering that system takes deep understanding of which way to go and 
mobilization of broad support.  This is more than “controlling” people.  A good system 
may be difficult to understand; its principles may be hard to verbalize yet possible to 
learn through action or instruction.  For example, a rigid grip of a rowing oar may 
increase the feeling of control but decrease absorption of the shock of uneven waters, 
thereby decreasing actual control.  Managers may use “heavyhanded” incentives and 
authority to increase their feeling of control and drive noncompliance out of sight, 
simultaneously increasing the discrepancy between rules and actual behavior. 
 
In summary, we have argued for the importance and difficulty of learning from 
experience.  Nuclear power plants and chemical plants are challenged by the hazards in 
their work processes to learn from problems and to overcome barriers to learning.  The 
history of these industries and the case studies we have examined suggest that there is a 
common progression from local learning to a control orientation associated with single-
loop learning, which is then held in place by managerial and professional culture.  Yet 
problems continue to occur and many organizations seek to be more proactive by 
becoming a learning organization, which incorporates mutually-reinforcing elements of 
attitudes and thinking patterns.  Our results suggest that, to some degree at least, attitudes 
favorable to learning precede double-loop learning skills.  The concepts and skills of deep 
learning seem to be difficult to master and to require significant commitment, discipline, 
and learning-in-action.  Future research will undoubtedly put more flesh on the bones of 
this framework, and contribute alternative ways to think about organizational learning.   21
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Figure 1 
The Four Stages of Organizational Learning 
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